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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-2a-3(2)(j) of
the Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended and 78-2-2(4) (1953) as amended.
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the Plaintiff failed to
strictly comply with the Notice of Claim Provisions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. This issue is preserved by Plaintiffs motion in opposition to the
State's motion to dismiss and oral arguments made at the hearing on the motion. R. at
40-60 (opposition motion) and R. at 114 (hearing transcript).
Standard of Review: A District Court's dismissal of a case based on
governmental immunity is a determination of law which is reviewed for correctness.
Hall v. Utah State Dept. OfCorr., 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a). Claim for injury—Notice—ContentsService—Legal disability.
(a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i)
a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally
construed-Rules of equity prevail.
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish the
1

laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and
all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the
objects of the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance
between the rules of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same
matter the rules of equity shall prevail.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case. This is an appeal from the District Court's

dismissal of the State of Utah for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The case against Magna Investments &
Development is currently pending and in the process of discovery.
B.

* Course of proceedings and disposition in the court below.

The Plaintiff filed her complaint in this case on January 9, 2003, seeking damages
against the State of Utah and Magna Investments & Development for injuries she
sustained when she slipped and fell on ice that had accumulated on the sidewalk in
front of a Utah State Liquor Store. R. at 1-7. In short, Plaintiff alleged that
Defendants were negligent in the maintenance of the property, negligent in the
construction of the water drainage system, negligent in removing ice that had
accumulated on the sidewalk, and due to Defendants negligence, Plaintiff suffered
injuries. R. at 1-7. Before answering Plaintiffs complaint, on January 22, 2003, the
State of Utah filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Plaintiff failed to comply with the
2

notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. R. at 16-18. In their
motion, the State claimed that Plaintiff did not include a sufficient "brief statement of
facts" as required by the Act. R. at 17. Although the notice of claim stated that the
fall occurred "in front of a Utah State Liquor Store," the State claimed that the notice
was insufficient because it failed to specify the exact address of the liquor store where
Plaintiff was injured. See generally, State's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Dismiss, R. at 19-39.
In opposition to the State's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed an opposition motion
and memorandum in support of her motion in opposition. R. at 40-60. The State
filed a response to Plaintiffs opposition. R. at 61-68. A hearing was held infrontof
the Honorable Judge Timothy R. Hanson on May 12,2003. See Transcript of Hearing
R. at 114. At the hearing Judge Hanson heard argumentsfromboth parties and
concluded that Plaintiff had failed to strictly comply with the Governmental Immunity
Act. R. at 77-81 (Order Granting State's Motion to Dismiss attached as addendum
A). In the order granting the State's motion to dismiss, signed May 27, 2003, the
Judge specifically held as a matter of law that:
1.
2.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i) of the Act required claimant to
have included a "brief statement of facts" relating to the Accident in her
Notice of Claim.
The Act does not explicitly identify which facts are to be included;
accordingly, this Court must look to the purpose of the Act to determine
what facts should be included in a Notice of Claim.
According to the Supreme Court, the purposes of the Act are twofold: to
provide the State with "an opportunity to correct the condition that
caused the injury," and to "evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the
matter without expense of litigation." Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County,
3

42 P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d
1201, 1204 (Utah 1999).
Accordingly, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, this Court
concludes that the Notice of Claim, in a slip and fall case such as this,
must identify the location of the accident. In this case, claimant should
have provided the address of the liquor store at issue; her reference to an
unidentified Utah State Liquor store did not provide the State with the
location of the Accident.
Therefore, the claimant failed to comply with the Notice of Claim
provision of the Act, and so this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over plaintiffs claim against the State. Accordingly, the State of Utah
should be dismissed from this case.
The court further concludes that although the State may have had actual
notice of the location of the Accident from other correspondence sent by
plaintiffs counsel, the court will not consider such extrinsic evidence
because actual notice "does not cure a party's failure" to comply with
the notice of the claim provisions of the Act. Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete
County, 42 P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County,
977 P.2d 1201,1204 (Utah 1999).

4.

5.

6.

R. at 79-81 (Order Granting State's motion to dismiss). After granting the State's
motion to dismiss the Judge certified the issue and entered Final Judgment in
favor of the State pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). R. at 81 and R.
at 86-87. Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal with the court on June 16, 2003. R. at
91-92 (attached as addendum B).
C.

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

Ms. Peeples slipped and fell on ice that had accumulated on a sidewalk outside
of a Utah State Liquor store on December 5, 2001. R. at 59. After Ms. Peeples fell,
she provided the State with documents regarding the nature of her claim. R. at 51, 524 and 55-8. Specifically, Ms. Peeples sent the State Risk Management Department a
letter on March 12, 2002 stating the date of the accident, the exact address of where
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the accident occurred, and information about what condition caused the accident. R. at
51, (Attached as addendum C). On June 17,2002, Plaintiff again sent State Risk
Management a letter outlining Ms. Peeple's injuries in more detail, enclosed with the
letter was a "brochure" that included a summary of the accident, all Plaintiffs
medical bills to date, a report from the Ambulance company containing the location of
the liquor store, and other reports and information relevant to her claim. R. at 52-4
and 55-8, (Attached as addendum D, letter to Risk Management and E, ambulance
report). Subsequent to the brochure and letters being sent to State Risk Management,
on September 18, 2002, Ms. Peeples filed her notice of claim by sending it to Utah
State Risk Management, the Utah Attorney General, and the Salt Lake County
Recorder. R. at 59-60. "There[] [is] no dispute that [the notice of claim] was filed
timely and upon the right person/5 R. at 114:p. 3 line 21-22.
The notice of claim that was properly filed contained a statement of facts that
included the fact that the accident occurred at a Utah State Liquor Store; it briefly
stated when the accident occurred; it outlined how the accident occurred; it described
Plaintiffs injuries; and, it alleged that the State of Utah's negligence caused
Plaintiffs injuries. R. at 59-60. With regard to the exact location of the accident,
Plaintiffs notice did not give the address of the Utah State Liquor Store. See, R. at
Id. Although the notice of claim did not have the address of the accident, other
correspondence sent to State Risk Management prior to the Notice of Claim being
sent, informed State Risk Management at which store the accident occurred. See, R. at
51, 52-4, and 55-8.
5

At the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss and in the State's pleadings, the
State conceded they had actual knowledge of the address of the liquor store. R. at 66
and 114:p. 10 line 3-4. Despite the fact that the State had actual knowledge of the
address, the trial judge refused to consider this "extrinsic" evidence to determine
whether Plaintiffs notice fulfilled the purposes of the Act and gave the State adequate
information "'to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and
to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of
public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.'" R. at 80: f 6 and Wills v.
Heber Valley Historic Railroad Auth., 2003 UT 45 at \ 6, 485 Utah Adv. Rep.23
(quoting Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980)).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISIONS OF
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
The Plaintiff did, in fact, strictly comply with provisions in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. As required by the Act, Plaintiffs notice of claim
included a "brief statement of the facts." Additionally, the District court erred by
requiring Plaintiff to include facts in her notice that are not required by the Act.
A.

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS REASONABLE.

Due to ambiguities in the Act, this Court should liberally construe the Act with
a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice by holding that
Plaintiffs notice was reasonable. In this case, the statute merely states that a claimant
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shall give a "brief statement of the facts." Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i).
This language in the statute is void of any guidance regarding what facts are
important, necessary, material, or relevant. Therefore, liberally construing the
Governmental Immunity Act and promoting justice, Plaintiffs notice of claim was
reasonable.
B.

PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS REASONABLE
AND CONGRUENT WITH THE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE
OF THE ACT.

Plaintiffs notice of claim was reasonable and congruent with the purpose of
the Act because it provided enough information "'to afford the responsible public
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of
a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the
expenditure of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.5" Wills at f 6
(quoting Stahl at 482). In this case, the statute merely states that a claimant shall give
a "brief statement of the facts." Plaintiffs notice was reasonable and congruent with
the purpose and objective of the act because her notice provided the State more than
enough information to "pursue a proper and timely investigation." Id.
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO CONSIDER
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE WHETHER
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPER.
The District Court erred when it failed to consider extrinsic evidence to
determine whether Plaintiffs notice of claim was reasonable, whether it was
congruent with the purpose and objective of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, or
whether the notice strictly complied with the Act. To determine if the notice of claim
7

has sufficient facts "'to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to
pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim/" the trial court
should consider whether or not the information did in fact provide enough information
to conduct a meaningful investigation. Wills at 16. Moreover, where there is
ambiguity in the Act, the trial court should consider extrinsic evidence and actual
knowledge when making its decision. Therefore, where there is ambiguity in the Act,
the consideration of extrinsic evidence is necessary to determine if the notice of claim
was reasonable, whether it provided enough information to conduct an investigation,
or whether Plaintiff strictly complied.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE OF CLAIM PROVISIONS OF
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT.
Plaintiff did, in fact, strictly comply with the provisions contained in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act ("the Act"), contrary to the trial court judge's ruling. As
required by the Act, Plaintiffs notice of claim included a "brief statement of the
facts." Additionally, the District court erred by requiring Plaintiff to include facts in
her notice that are not required by the Act. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act
requires that the Plaintiffs notice "shall set forth: (i) a brief statement of the facts; (ii)
the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far
as they are known..." Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1 l((3)(a) (1997)(as amended).
At issue in this case is whether Plaintiffs notice complied with the Act by providing
8

"brief statement of the facts." (a copy of the notice is attached as addendum F). As
required, Plaintiff included a brief statement of facts relating to her accident in her
notice of claim. R. at 59-60. In their motion and at the motion hearing, the State
argued that Plaintiffs notice was insufficient because it did not include the address of
the Utah State Liquor store where the accident occurred. R. at 114:p. 4 line 10-14 and
R. at 17. In opposition to the State's position, Plaintiff argued that she did comply
with the requirements of the Act by including a "brief statement of the facts." R. at
114:p. 10 line 13-16. At the conclusion of the motion hearing in this case, the trial
court judge took into consideration the purpose of the Act, which he interpreted to be
correct, and ruled that "in a slip and fall case such as this, [the Plaintiff] must identify
the location of the accident." R. at 80:14.
It is the Plaintiffs position that she did comply with the the Act when she
included a brief statement of the facts. Moreover, it was improper for the trial court to
compel the Plaintiff to include the address which is not required by the Act. Here, the
Act is void of any factual requirements. There is no necessity that Plaintiff even
include material facts.
In Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, 53 P.3d 2, the plaintiff sued a doctor for
medical malpractice who was employed by the University of Utah, a State institution.
In order to comply with the Act for filing a malpractice action, Nunez filed a notice of
claim with the doctor and the Utah Attorney General. Id. at f 3. The doctor filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing he was immune from suit as an employee of
the University. Id. at f 5. Nunez moved to amend her complaint to include the
9

University as a defendant, but the trial court refused to allow the amendment because
Nunez allegedly failed to comply with the Act by not serving the notice on the
University. Id. at f 6. Overruling the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that the
trial judge erred because the notice of claim complied with the Act, which did not
necessitate the University of Utah or its medical school to be separately named. Id. at
f23-27.
In this case, and like the Nunez case, because the Act simply requires a "brief
statement of facts," Plaintiff complied with the plain language of the Act. The Act
only requires a "brief statement of the facts," and to compel anything more is
improper. Specifically, to require that Plaintiff include material facts would be error
because the plain language of the Act does not necessitate it, on the same token, it is
improper for the trial court to require facts that are not called for by the Act. When
the trial court held that the Plaintiff "must identify the location of the accident," it was
an error that constituted an application of a higher standeird which is not required by
the Act. It may be characterized that the trial court applied a standard of "perfect
compliance" in violation of the plain language of the Act. See, R. at 80: f4.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court and hold that because Plaintiff
included a "brief statement of the facts," she thereby complied with requirements of
the Act.

10

A. PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IN HER NOTICE OF
CLAIM WAS REASONABLE
Due to ambiguities in the statute, Plaintiffs notice was reasonable and
congruent with the purpose of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. In this case, the
statute merely states that a claimant shall give a "brief statement of the facts." Utah
Code Annotated § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i). This language in the statute is void of any
guidance regarding what facts are important, necessary, material, or relevant.
Because of the ambiguity and lack of guidance, this Court may hold that the statute is
vague and ambiguous. In this case, principles of fairness and equity necessitate that
the Act be liberally construed and interpreted reasonably. In other jurisdictions, it has
been held that notice provisions such as the one at issue in this case are in derogation
of the common law and, therefore, such statutes must be strictly construed. See, e.g.,
Collier v. Prater, 544 N.E.2d 497,498 (Ind. 1989); H. Winter Metal Co. v. City of
Chicago, 493 N.E.2d 93 (111. App. 1986).
In Utah, however, statutes in derogation of the common law are treated
differently:
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish
the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a
view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever
there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law
in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. Moreover, in Ringwood v. State, the Utah Supreme court
addressed this statute and how ambiguous statutes should be interpreted by stating:

11

We remain aware of the requirements of our law that our statutes are to be
given a liberal interpretation to effectuate their purposes. That having been
said, however, it must also be recognized that where a statute charges one with
a duty or imposes a burden or a penalty, it must do so with sufficient clarity
and definiteness that one of ordinary intelligence will understand what he is
required to do. And in case of alternative choices, he can comply by selecting
the one which is the least burdensome or least offensive to him.
333 P.2d 943, 944 (Utah 1959) (footnote citations omitted).
In addition to liberally construing statutes, in cases of first impression like the
present1, the Utah Supreme Court in an early case citing the original and almost
exactly worded statute, stated that a court must give "full force and effect" to the
concept of liberal interpretation found in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2. Houston Real
Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 44 Utah 64,138 P. 1159,1161 (Utah 1914).
Therefore, while the plain meaning of statute must not be ignored, Utah Code
Ann. § 68-3-2 makes mandatory the requirement that the statute be liberally construed
with a view to effecting the objects of the statute and to promotes justice. Currier v.
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1373 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Thus, for example, in construing
Utah's wrongful death statute, the Supreme Court, citing section 68-3-2, has declined
to limit damages to pecuniary losses which were not expressly authorized by statute.
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp. Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). Similarly, in
garnishment proceedings, the Supreme Court has cited section 68-3-2 in holding that
the statutes and rules governing such proceedings must be "liberally construed with
the object of promoting justice so that both sides to the controversy may have a fair
1

Plaintiffs counsel has searched cases in Utah and has been unable to find a case in
which the court has analyzed what constitutes a reasonable or sufficient "brief
statement of facts."
12

opportunity to present their claims on the merits." Remington Rand, Inc. v. O 'Neil,
309 P.2d 368, 370 (Utah 1957). In each of these cases, the Court has applied a rule of
reason and liberal construction to the statutes under consideration.
In this case, the statute is void of any guidance as to what facts are required.
The statute simply requires that the Plaintiff submit a "brief statement of facts." Here,
Plaintiff submitted a statement of the facts as the Act compels and because she was
without notice that "in a slip and fall case such as this, [Plaintiff] must identify the
location of the accident," it would be inequitable, unfair and unreasonable to uphold
the trial court's ruling. R. at 80: f4. Moreover, to enforce a standard higher than the
one found in the statute by requiring Plaintiff to include facts not mandated by the
statute would be equally unfair. Because Plaintiff was without proper notice, her
notice of claim was reasonable and this Court should "liberally construe[] [the Act in
this case] with the object of promoting justice so that both sides to the controversy
may have a fair opportunity to present their claims on the merits." Remington Rand,
Inc. at 370. Therefore, this Court should hold that Plaintiffs notice of claim was
reasonable under the circumstances and reverse the trial courts decision.

B. PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE WAS REASONABLE AND
CONGRUENT WITH THE PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE OF THE
ACT.
Plaintiffs notice was reasonable and congruent with the purpose and objective
of the act because it provided enough information "'to afford the responsible public
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of
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a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the
expenditure of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.'" Wills at f 6
(quoting Stahl at 482). As noted above, the Act only requires a "brief statement of the
facts" and this language in the statute is without any guidance regarding what facts are
important, necessary, material, or relevant. Because of the ambiguity and lack of
guidance, this Court may hold that the statute is vague and ambiguous. In addition to
principles of fairness and equity outlined above, when a statute is vague or
ambiguous, courts will "look . . . to traditional methods of statutory construction.
Preeminent among these principles is that any proposed interpretation of a statute
must be compatible with its purpose and objective Wills at f 5 (citing O 'Keefe v.
Utah State Ret Bd., 956 P.2d 279,280 (Utah 1998)).
Contrary to the trial court's ruling in this case, the purpose of the Act is very
broad and in some cases less than strict compliance may be proper because of
ambiguities in the Act. Although there is no case holding that "reasonable
compliance" or "sufficient compliance" is enough, there is authority for "allowing
less than strict compliance . . . in cases which depended on ambiguities in the Act."
There are at least two cases where the Supreme Court may have allowed
something "less than strict compliance." The first case is Larson v. Park City Mun.
Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998). In Larson, Ms. Larson was injured in a bicycle
accident that occurred on land owned by Park City Municipal Corporation. Id. at 343.
2

Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 25, f7, 69 P.2d 1287 (citing Larson v. Park
CityMun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998) (allowing [a] claim where [the]
statute was unclear as to where notice was to be filed)).
14

Because Park City Municipal Corpoi ation is a governmental entity, Larson filed a
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Moreno, the case''involved the drowning of a boy named Bill in a s\\ immp
OAMicd and opemlnl 1^ Ionian ^V'"»'>! I >•« |

A

?jto at 88 7 St • - -. .ears odore,

the Morenos u ere ;r\ arded permanent custody and guardianship oi oili
parental i igm.- wi Bill's natural mother, Laura Bartlett, were never terminated. Id.
i'Villcn «• • *< •

• . . . . „,

seeking to recover dan\'m<w for the wrongful 1r j!

i. n \lien own bend:",,

Immunity Act. Id. The school district moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
Morenos could not maintain their wrongful death action because they were Bill's
guardians, not his heirs. Id, The trial court denied the school district's summary
judgment motion, ruling that the Morenos could bring the action on their own behalf.
The court also denied Bartlett's motion to intervene, ruling that the Morenos were the
real party in interest. Id.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court, held that the Immunity Act gave the
Morenos the right to bring a wrongful death action but only "in behalf of the ward's
heirs," Bill's natural mother, Bartlett. Id. at 889-90. Despite her failure to file a
notice of claim, the Supreme Court allowed Bartlett to "piggyback" on the Morenos'
notice and intervene in the action they filed. Id. at 892. Overlooking the technical
defect in the notice of claim, the Court found that the notice of the facts surrounding
the claim, the nature of the claim, and the amount of damages that would be sought
and was "legally sufficient to support the maintenance of [Bartlett's] wrongful death
action." Id. (emphasis added).
Like the Larson and Moreno cases, this case presents a situation where the
State has argued and the trial court has held that Plaintiffs notice was not sufficient
and was not congruent with the purpose and objective of the Act. Specifically, in the
State's reply memorandum to Plaintiffs opposition motion, the State argued that
Plaintiffs notice was not sufficient and the purpose of the Act is "twofold: both to
provide the State 'an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury, [and]
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In response to the State's position, Plaintiff argued in the hearing that her
notice was sufficient and the purpose of the act is a much broader issue than just an
o
1 x 4:p. 13 line 14 1 7 and p.14 line 18-24. In addition to arguing that the purpose of
the Act is broader issue, Plaintiff also read to the court the purpose of the Act that was

Plaintiffs argument that the purpose is more broad than the one cited by the State, the
trial court agreed w i t h the State's limited .purpose. R at 8 0 : 1 4 . Citing Pigs Gun

County, 1999 U T 36, 977 P.2d 1 2 0 1 , 1 2 0 4 (Utah 1999), 'the trial court held that
"according to.the Supreme Court, the purposes of the Act are twofold: to provide tit; i

Sink1 Willi "".ill ippnilmiily hi IOIIWI (lie condition llial caused the injur) , and to
"evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without expense of litigation." R. at
80: f 6.
A case thai addressed the scope ol (he purpose ami objective ol the ,' \t 1 is ll'i'i i "i
v Heber Valley Historic Railroad Autk.

In Wills, the Supreme Court held that the

motorists' notice of claim was proper under the Act when they sent their notice of

The purpose found in the Nunez opinion was a quote from the Stahl case. ~ T Tx~1~
Supreme Court case decided in 1980, More recently the Supreme C o u r t , ;
recent opinion reaffirmed and cited their statement of the purpose •'•*" 'he j
the Stahl case, <?.-. • Wills at 1 6 (quoting Stahl at 482).
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claim to the Attorney General at the Heber Wells Building, which is not the office
where the Attorney General resides. Id. at f 8. The State argued that the purpose of
the Act was to "maximize efficiency of claim processing by limiting the delivery of
notices to one location." Id. at If5. Further, the State argued that in order to effectuate
this purpose, "[s]uch efficiency . . . can be achieved only by interpreting the Act to
mandate that the notice of claim be directed and delivered to the attorney general
himself at the location in which he keeps a desk and chair." Id. Rejecting the State's
argument, the Supreme Court held that this interpretation of the Act is "too narrow,
and its view of the meaning of the 'direct and deliver' to be too restrictive." Id.
Despite the trial court's ruling, in this case the purpose of the Act is broad. In
Wills, it appears that the Supreme Court has focused on the issue of investigation and
settlement of claims to compensate victims. For the purposes of this case, the primary
focus is the issue of whether the notice of claim gave the State an opportunity to
conduct an investigation. The purpose is not to simply to remedy the condition as the
State has argued. Because the notice in this case provided the State information about
the claim, the State had the tools necessary to conduct an investigation. Therefore,
based on the information contained in the notice of claim, if the State had conducted a
"proper and timely investigation," it would have been clear where exactly the accident
occurred. Holding that the notice of claim must have the exact address of where the
accident occurred is contrary to the purpose and objective of the Act, contrary to the
plain language of the Act, and too narrow a reading of the requirements of the Act.
Accordingly, this Court should alternatively hold that due to the ambiguities and lack
18

of clear" 'requirements, Plaintiff s notice proper and,, congruent with the purpose and
objective of fa

C ~1JE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING l\). )NSIDER
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE WH H1111 k
PLAINT™7'*2 MOTirp OF CT V \ I WAS PROI' *
The Di*
determine whether Plaintiffs notice of claim was reasonable; or, whether the notice it
was congruent w ith the purpose and objective of the Utah Governmental Immunity
/

iillv I'OIHI'IIH J willi (In \i I I -I ittlciiiiitie ilThe null, H

of claim has sufficient facts "'to afford the responsible public authorities an
opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a chain-/~
liiiurmationinthenoiu^ ... ... ..,* .. ;r»

ir

r^* xJc enough information to conduct a meaningful investigation, )')' )i i • >• M '"'f«'»
(quotingStahl at •' ^
In I Nluili lln (HCiloiiiiiiiaiil position Liken lb1, appellate courts is Unit "[ajctual
notice does not cure a party's failure to meet" the requ irements of lln* \ e I V
f 19, Stated another way, * in the absence of some ambitzt

-t e appellate court] ,\ ill

mill fli lurh r\||iilihnit legislative requirements and read i..^ ... statute an actual notice
exception." Greene v. Utah TransitAuth

"' '

'

<
' » 1|l

l ?

PM"l"

' >

motion hearing, Plaintiff argued that extrinsic evidence needed to be considered by
the coin I to determine whether Hamuli's notice was reasonable and congruent with
tin* purpose ami ob|eelhe mil Hie \i i i« II ni mi I |i ni X nne i m mi \ i \ i liiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii

objection, the trial court held that extrinsic evidence would not be considered. R. at
80.
Although no court in Utah has explicitly stated that extrinsic evidence shall be
considered when a court must determine whether a notice was proper, there is at least
one case that appears to have considered such evidence. The case is Nunez v. Albo,
2002 UT App 247. In Nunez, the issue was whether the notice of claim, as filed with
the State Attorney General and served on the physician, provided sufficient notice of
possible claim against the University of Utah. See, Id. at \25-27. Holding that the
notice was proper, the court cited and relied on the fact that, in response to Nunez's
notice of claim, "Dr. Albo forwarded a copy of the notice of claim to the University's
Risk Management. In response, Risk Management wrote to Ms. Nunez
acknowledging that Dr. Albo was 'an employee of the University of Utah...
represented by counsel,' and asked that all communications concerning this matter be
directed either to Risk Management or to Dr. Albo's counsel of record." Nunez at
f 26. After citing the fact that the University of Utah had responded to the notice of
claim, the Nunez court stated that "[c]learly the University was put on notice of Ms.
Nunez's claim and recognized its potential liability for Dr. Albo's treatment." Id. at
f 27. Although it is not clearly stated, the Nunez opinion implicitly relies on the
extrinsic evidence regarding how the State responded to the notice. The court
specifically stated that "[bjased on this notice, the University was free to investigate
the merits of the claim and 'arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate.' Thus,

20

although the University was not specifically named, the purpose of the Immunity
-Ai T i iiiitii i

I I iiiim "i \dii lulfilled.1 ' Id, (quoting/). .

- ).
!

In this case, as in the Nunez ease *'• •
to determine \\ hether the notice was propei

V\" 111 1 11 1 11inning w hat the State ^^

h • -,H.|:M J the notice, it i,s nupu:>t>il>li: to determine if the notice was sufficient to
allow" the State to conduct and invrstifalmn

lni e^n iiipli , I (In" |nii[n)si nil 111«

"statement of facts" section is to provide the State enough information to conduct an
in i 'cstigation, the court shwuki ^Mi.^vki what the investigation uncovered befoic
ruling thatthe infonr..r^on in thf*

• •

•

e: ..;,:< -

ambiguity in the statute, this need is h }j«jt lighted due to the disadvantage the Plaintiff
Itas in determining wii.«i is complete'

-~,uu^< *

\ the statute Because the statute in *hh ease
*.-'*•

•

—

* *5

needed, the determination of whether the State was able to conduct an investigation is
imperative. Moreover, even in the context of the strict compliance standard, this
( Yniil >ln iiliil

Hisiiin llir i vtiniMi rvidukv heuiusc nl die ainbiguil) ol the statute.

Therefore, where there is ambiguity in the Ac * *he consider;*evidence is necessary to determine if tne notice of el.:tm ^ as reasonable in iuht of the
amln^uilv, -n, vvhdlin si pn vidrd .'Him^li mb-

. *n to conduct an investigation: or,

whether Plaintiff strictly complied. This Court should reverse f In' 1 n„11 rniiil's
decision and hold that Plaintiffs notice was proper. In the alternative , this cour t
)ui t to determine if the State was able to conduct
an investigation based on the notin; and disrMwi <hr inra'1')'

' 'h accident

However, remanding the case may be futile because, assuming Risk Management
conducted the investigation, a cursory review of their own files would show they had
letters from Plaintiffs counsel and medical records explicitly listing the address of the
accident, therefore, fulfilling the purpose and objective of the Act. R. at 51, 52-4, and
55-8.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff maintains that she did, in fact, strictly comply with the requirements
of the Utah Governmental Immunities Act. In the alternative, Plaintiffs notice was
reasonable and congruent with the purpose and objective of the Act. Finally, it was
improper for the trial court not to consider extrinsic evidence to determine if Plaintiff
strictly complied, whether the notice was reasonable in light of the ambiguities in the
Act, or whether the notice was congruent with the purpose and objective of the Act.
Therefore, the trial court's decision should be reversed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Q

day of December, 2003.

Siegfried & Jensen

Brock A. Van de Kamp
Dustin Lance
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/ Appellant
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day of J )ecember 21 )( )3

the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, 'first class

postage prepaid to-

Barry Lawrence
Assistant Attorney General
Mark Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant, State ol" 1, Itah
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-8056
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee, State of U^ 1 '
Terry Plant
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attomeys for Defendant Magna Investment & Development
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND L< >R
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DELONE PEEPLES,

ORDER GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
r

i H L STA I L Ol- U IAJ1 and MAGNA
INVESTMENTS & DFVF1 OPM FN T
limited partnership,
CasoN

-i-MMiVW

Defendants.
Jans on

^ L i H i i in * -

-M.*> case arises out o f a >up ar.ii iall acckient that occurred

on D e c e m b e r 5, 2001.,, ii i front of a I Jtah State I •iqi lor Store (the " Occident") I Maintiff filed a
Notice of Claim on September 18, 2002, relating to the Accident, and on Januaiy 8, 2003, filed a
( Ol) | ,;<!„ a!

l u u i m e i K v.'aLiauiM AhiL'i:

Store.) On January 22, 2003, the State responded with a Motion to Dismiss (along with a

provision (Utah Code Ann fc 6 \-*sii-l 1 i of the Utah Goxernmrntal ImmurriU \rt i\ Mah < *ndc
Ann. >sG^-.v-i.v- sett ith<jVw.i >• - lading to pn-tdw ..^ io.aipjiiuii;., \ ^ i u , n i, i^-"
Notice. On tebruai \

]]

'< *( pv plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the State's Motion.

The State then filed a reply memorandum in support of its Motion on February 25, 2003, On
M;n L\Jln«11 \\\ " ! n<! ;j \\ \\ h. MMII;1,

IUMI, ,'I,I,

,/ , i, (!) Sf;ifr\ MHtnn H;if«-fi hn\r"ii<'

Assistant Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the State of Utah; Brock Van de Kamp of
^icg-n-ju -v .: j.i.^i. jpp-a.^. .

...

'lant, ' /\ allace, Ch ristensen &

Kanell, was also present on bchal*'of Magna Investments & Development.
Ruling on the Motion (o Dssnu^. i he Stale oi Utah argued that the plaintiff 5s claims
.i!>ain-• • ••-. •-. !- •

l

-

'

"

*-..vanse plaintiffs Notice oi Claim failed to identify the

location of the Accident. Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i) only required that a
Notice • :)f Claim contain a "<:;;bi ief staten lent of facts" and did i lot expressly require the location of
the Accident. At the conclusion of the oral argument, and having considered the pleadings and
submissions of tl le par ties, and the ai gut nent of coi msel, the Com t gi a nted the State'' s I \ loti- :>i I to
Dismiss.
The Court specifically rules as follows:

2

*-*

For purposes of the State's Motion, this < 'nnrl holds llli.il lllic folium inj» fm Is, tilt ii
from plaintiffs Complaint and Notice of Claim,, are not in dispute:

front of a Utah State Liquor Store.
a::itiff filed a Notice oi Llaim on Septemhc; i *v JoO.:. , Jating h> AK A a uk nt
-,. i^i that Notice of Claim, plaintiff provided the following statement concerning the
Accident:
On December 5, 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front of a Utah State Liquor Store on
ice, which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorly designed
rain gutter that drains onto the top of the sidewalk, ra'her than underneath it.
' I he nextpaiagr.i.; .

'

..-•*•

-v.-

*.

••. ., •., . i

i^v.-.e

paragraph describes plaintiffs alleged damages.
:w- \. -.. .• oi * .aiiii.iii! not !dciiti!> at \-.MV

-. u... M.UC • iquor Store the Accident

occurred.
For purposes of the State's Motion to Dismiss, this Court makes the following
emu i -

law:
lah L ode Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(i) of the Act required claimant to have included a

"b ! •' *:.Men ..

• 'Is" Ri.iliiij" Iiu Hit At t itltiil lit hii Nulni nil htm.

he Act does not explicitly idcntifv which facts are to be included; accordingly, this
Court :-ais; iuoK U: ;;,c purpose oi Uw AJI \o victu-mme \\ hat iaci> should be included in a Notice
of Claim.
3

"" Ii ::!

3. According to the Utah Supreme Court, the purposes of the Act are twofold: to provide
the State with "an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury", and to "evaluate
the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without expense of litigation." Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete
County, 42 P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah
1999).
4. Accordingly, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, this Court concludes that
the Notice of Claim, in a slip and fall case such as this, must identify the location of the accident.
In this case, claimant should have provided the address of the liquor store at issue; her reference
to an unidentified Utah State Liquor store did not provide the State with the location of the
Accident.
5. Therefore, the claimant failed to comply with the Notice of Claim provision of the
Act, and so this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim against the State.
Accordingly, the State of Utah should be dismissed from this case.
6. The Court further concludes that although the State may have had actual notice of the
location of the Accident from other correspondence sent by plaintiffs counsel, the court will
not consider such extrinsic evidence because actual notice "does not cure a party's failure" to
comply with the notice of claim provisions of the Act. Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 42
P.3d 379, 382 (Utah 2002); Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999).
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendant State of Utah's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
4

2. Plaintiffs claims against the State asserted herein are hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
3. This Order resolves all claims pending between the plaintiff and the State of Utah.
Further, because the issue involved on this motion (i.e., governmental immunity) is unique to the
State, there is no just reason for delaying the conclusion of this matter. Accordingly, this Court
directs that Final Judgment be entered in this matter in favor of the State of Utah pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 54(b).
DATED this a \

day of May, 2003.

ANSON
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Brock Van de Kamp, 8907
SIEGFRIED & J E N S E N
5664 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 266-0999
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN T H E THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Delone Peeples
an Individual,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
VS.
State of Utah
Defendant/Respondent
and
Magna Investments
& Magna development, a limited partnership,

Case NO. 030900399
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendant

-000O000-

Noticeis hereby given thatPlaintiff and Appellant, DelonePeeples, through counsel, appeals to the
Utah Supreme Court thefinaljudgment of Timothy R. Hanson dismissing the State of Utah, entered on this
matter on May 27,2003. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment dismissing the State of Utah. A
transcript of the motion hearing has been ordered but not received.
DATED this / 3

day of June, 2003.

Brock Van de Kamp
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 11^/) day of June 2003,1 caused to be mailed,first-class,postage prepaid,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following counsel of record:
Barry Lawrence
Assistant Attorney General
Mark Shurtleff
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant, State of Utah
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-8056

Terry M. Plant
Plant, Wallace, Christansen & Kanell
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

*%

TabC

LAW O F F I C E S OF

SIEGFBIED & JENSEN

N E D P. S I E G F R I E D
MITCHELL R J E N S E N *
P R E S T O N L. H A N D Y
MATTHEW J . STOREY

5 6 B 4 SOUTH G R E E N STREET
MURRAY, UTAH: 6 4 1 2 3
TELEPHONE: (SOI) 2 6 6 - 0 9 9 9

OF COUNSEL
M I C H A E L F. R I C H M A N *
M I C H A E L A. KATZ
A. J O H N W I T K O W S K I *
B A R B A R A L. T O W N S E N D '
B A R R Y K. M I L L E R
•A*-SP ADMITTED tN CAUrORNIA
•ALSO ADMITTED IN COLORADO

FAX: ( S O ! ) 2 6 6 - 1 3 3 6
PROVO

375-0999

OGDEN
399-0999

March 12,2002

Utah State Risk Management
ATTN: Claims Adjuster
5120 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
RE:

Our Client:
Your Insured:
Location:
Date Of Loss:

LEGAL ASSISTANTS
B R Y A N T E. H A N S O N
S T E P H A N I E MASH
BETTY M. CUMMOCK
TAMMARA SHEPARD
R U B E N MARTINEZ
TONI A. S I N G L E T A R Y
SANDY LEATHERBURY
KATHY D U G D A L E
ANN LE
JILL HANSEN
CARLOS OJEDA
BETTY J E A N H U T K I N
CINDY DISRAELI
C H R I S OGURA
STACEY B E A L S
MINDY GANNUSCIA
GREG MALONE

Delone Peeples
Utah State Liquor Store
1863 East 7000 South, SLC, Utah
December 5, 2001

Dear Claims Adjuster:
This office has been retained to represent Delone Peeples in connection with a slip and fall
incident that occurred outside the Cottonwood Plaza, State Of Utah Liquor Store located at 1863
East 7000 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Ms. Peeples fell on ice on the sidewalk to the store that had
accumulated due to the rain gutter draining across the sidewalk.
As a result of this fall, Delone has sustained multiple injuries. I would appreciate it if you
would send me a copy of the declaration page of your insurance policy verifying the coverages
available under their policy.
Please direct all questions and correspondence regarding this claim to my attention. Should
you have any questions, in connection with this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me or my
assistant, Stephanie Mash.
Very truly yours,
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

MRJ:sm
cc: Regular Mail

Mitchell R Jensten
V _ ^
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LAW O F F I C E S OF

SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
N E D P. S I E G F R I E D
M I T C H E L L R. J E N S E N *
P R E S T O N L. HANDY
MATTHEW J . STOREY
M I C H A E L A. KATZ
D U S T I N LANCE
S A M U E L ADAMS

5664

SOUTH G R E E N

STREET

MURRAY, TJTAH: 8 4 1 2 3
TELEPHONE: (SOU 2 6 6 - 0 9 9 9
FAX: {SOU 2 6 6 - 1 3 3 8

OF COUNSEL
M I C H A E L F. R I C H M A N *
J A M E S W. G I L S O N

PROVO

OGDEN

375-0999

399-0999

J u n e 17, 2 0 0 2

•ALSO ADMITTED IN CALIFORNIA

J i m Sefandonakis
UTAH STATE RISK MANAGEMENT
5 1 2 0 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, U t a h 8 4 1 1 4
RE:

O u r Client:
Your I n s u r e d :
Claim N u m b e r :
Date of Loss:

LEGAL ASSISTANTS
B R Y A N T E. H A N S O N
S T E P H A N I E MASH
BETTY M. CUMMOCK
G R E G MALONE
GEORGE SERGAKIS
TAMMARA SHEPARD
R U B E N MARTINEZ
TONI A SINGLETARY
S A N D Y LEATHERBURY
KATHY D U G D A L E
A N N LE
JILL HANSEN
CARLOS OJEDA
BETTY J E A N HUTKIN
CINDY DISRAELI
C H R I S OGURA
STACEY BEALS
MINDY SWENSON

Delone Peeples
Utah State Liquor Store
Unknown
D e c e m b e r 5, 2 0 0 1

D e a r Mr. Sefandonakis:
Enclosed with this letter is a b r o c h u r e outlining Delone Peeple's i n j u r i e s .
D e l o n e fell in front of t h e U t a h State Liquor Store on ice w h i c h w a s allowed to
a c c u m u l a t e on t h e sidewalk, from a poorly designed rain gutter t h a t d r a i n s onto t h e top
of the side walk r a t h e r t h a n u n d e r n e a t h it. (I have enclosed photos of t h e s c e n e for your
review) It is also clear t h a t t h e t e n a n t failed to t a k e a d e q u a t e m e a s u r e s of ice r e m o v a l ,
especially considering t h e facts which would p u t t h e m on notice of t h i s p e r m a n e n t
d a n g e r o u s condition.
Paramedics were called to t h e scene a n d t r a n s p o r t e d Delone to St. M a r k ' s
Hospital. X-rays a n d other diagnostic s t u d i e s revealed multiple h i p fractures. Delone
a l s o s u s t a i n e d multiple c o n t u s i o n s a n d a b r a s i o n s to h e r left leg, left a n k l e , b a c k , left
s h o u l d e r a n d left a r m . S h e w a s a d m i t t e d to t h e hospital for i n p a t i e n t care a n d pain
management.
On December 9, 2001 Delone w a s moved to H e a l t h s o u t h Rehabilitation for
physical therapy. While t h e r e , s h e developed severe low b a c k p a i n w h i c h r e n d e r e d h e r
u n a b l e to walk. She w a s t h e n transferred b a c k to St. Mark's Hospital w h e r e t e s t i n g
s h o w e d t h a t Delone w a s suffering from m o d e r a t e central spinal s t e n o s i s a n d m o d e r a t e
lateral recess stenosis at L3 to L5. The L4 to L5 disc levels s h o w e d m o d e r a t e left n e u r a l
foraminal narrowing a n d a b r o a d - b a s e d lateral bulge w i t h a d v a n c e d multilevel
degenerative spondylosis a n d bilateral sacral insufficiency f r a c t u r e s . Pelvis d i a g n o s t i c s
s h o w e d bilateral sacral insufficiency fractures a n d a h e m a t o m a along t h e left sciatic
nerve, a n d a comminuted left posterior superior pubic r a m u s fracture t h a t e x t e n d s down
to t h e j u n c t i o n of t h e inferior ischium p u b i s , a n d a n o n d i s p l a c e d fracture of t h e right
p u b i c ischium junction. Delone was started on a m o r p h i n e PCA p u m p for p a i n control,
a n d a course of occupational t h e r a p y a n d physical therapy. S h e w a s r e l e a s e d o n
J a n u a r y 16. 2 0 0 2 .

Jim Sefandonakis
UTAH RISK MANAGEMENT
J u n e 17, 2002
Page 2

Delone was inpatient in the hospital for over 40 days. She remained under
sedation and medication which interfered with her eating, bowel and bladder function.
Now she has to wear adult diapers which she did not have to wear prior to the fall.
Since her release Delone has worked diligently to return to the same level
of activity she enjoyed before the fall. Despite her efforts, she h a s fallen far short of her
pre-accident state of health. In fact, she is just now beginning to walk. Her mental
sharpness and focus are reduced from continued stress and use of multiple medications.
Her pain is chronic and requires ongoing medication. She h a s lost over 251bs. She
pushes herself to eat, but can't keep most food down. She lives on the drink "ensure" to
give her nourishment. She relies on her family to perform most tasks such as cleaning,
preparing meals, shopping and other necessary daily tasks.
Delone cannot drive nor pick up and hold her great-grandchildren. She has
trouble writing because of numbness in the fingers on her right hand. Her right shoulder
was bruised severely and consequently still gives her ongoing pain which affects her
ability to clean, cook, etc.
Prior to her fall, Delone was the primary care giver for her husband Richard
of 59 years who suffers from chronic back problems, requiring assistance and u s e of a
walker. Delone did all of the heavy house work and kept him comfortable. She would
get his prescriptions, do the shopping, the cleaning, get him books at the library and get
him out every day to walk the mall for exercise. As a result of Delone's inability to care
for Richard, his condition has worsened to the point of requiring that he be hospitalized.
Consequently, both Delone and Richard spent the holidays at St. Mark's Hospital.
Prior to the fall, Delone was a very active person for her age. She was quick
whitted and the life of every family gathering. She was proud of her appearance and
would rise early each day and get herself "put together" before going go to the senior
center to-exercise class.
As you can tell from this letter and the letter from her daughter, Diane
Kamp, the injuries Delone sustained in this fall have been a major set back both
physically and mentally for her and her husband.
She is very frustrated with her
limitations as she has always been able to care for herself and Richard. But now because
of her weakened condition and ongoing pain, she does not have the strength to do what
she once did.

Jim SefandonaMs
UTAH RISK MANAGEMENT
J u n e 17,2002
Page 3

As part of the enclosed brochure, I have attached and labeled the letter that
I received from Delone's daughter, Diane Kamp, describing her mother's abilities before
and after the fall. I have also enclosed information from Merry Maids, and Brighton
Gardens Of Salt Lake City, an assisted living care facility. Dr. Robert Powell's report
addresses the need for domestic help and the likely need for Delone to be placed in an
assisted care facility.
We would appreciate your timely evaluation of this claim and response to
the enclosed demand. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this claim, please
feel free to contact me or my Legal Assistant, Stephanie Mash.
Sincerely,
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

Mitchell R. Jensen
MRJ:sm
Enclosure: Brochure
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ie undersigned, understand that I am financially responsible for all charges and request that payment of authorized benefitsl)e made on my behalf to Gold
ss Sei vices Inc /d b a Gold Ci oss Ambulance for any ambulance services provided I authoi ize any holder of medical information or documentation about me
Please to the Health Care Financing Administration, HCFA, and its agents or other insurance carneis, as well as to Gold Cross Services, Inc 16 b a Gold Cross
bulaope, any information oudocumentanon needed to determine these benefits or benefits payable for related services ptovided now or in the future I
l3i?tancMI>di a seivice charge of 1 1/2% per month \18% APR) will be chaiged on all accounts over 30 days, with a minimum charge of fifty cents per month

•i .-.ildua

H or Rc oponLible Party Signature if rafflent is a Minor or is unable lo sign

i-(;.'.^i';Ol bce-i of^.re,j asseacrv^ra and evaluation, arnargeucy Ueatrnera. and ambulance iranspoiiauon, i /crluse:

CHECK ALL REASONS THAT APPLY
(
) assessment and evaluation,
(
) emergency treatment,
(
) ambulance transportation.,
ihai lias been offered to me or my child or ward. I, the undersigned, do hereby release ti~\e above indicated agency(s) and their
personnel Uoiri any and all further responsibility to the below mentioned patient and agree to consult a physician of my own choice, ir
h-js been clearly axpiaineci to me Hie possible consequences of my refusal.
Siqnc

! or Legal Guardian

Signature of Wil.nass fif patent refuses ro sign)

{ ) Patient, Parent or Legal Guardian refuses to sign
release after refusing services as cheeked above.
(swsss&BMawsswasKtiaisKisa

EQUIPMENT USED LIST

H4<

RUN NO. . < H - * 7 S " * I _

-E:_l n 1 LPl.
IENTNAME:

0 d*n.

tu

UNIT NO..

P^Us

LiST QUANTITIES USED OR REPLACED ON THE ABOVE PATIENT.
BANDAGES/DRESSINGS - KERI.IX
BANDAGES/DRESSINGS • TRIANGLE
BANDAGES/DRESSINGS - 4X1
BANDAGES/DRESSINGS • 8X10
BANDAGES/DRESSINGS - 5X9
BANPAGESORLSSJ^S • VASELINE GAUZE

1368

MED-VALIUM 10 MQ

2960

MED - VERAPAMIL 5MG/2ML

IV - SET • BLOOD

1883

NO. TUBE

2196

..._ IV - SET • BURETROL

1958

NEEDLESS HYPODERMIC #18

455

_.„ IV - SET - PEDIATRIC

1966
1974 _

620 „
2S32

463

2063

IV - RINGERS, 500 ML
„ _ IV-RINGERS. 1.000 ML

IV - SET • REGULAR

1313....

... SPLINT CARDBARD - LEG

NEEDLES. HYPODERMIC £20

794 _

... SPLINTING MAl'ERiALS (EXPLAIN)

NEEDLES. HYPODERMIC #22

2725 _

. STERILE WATER

O.B. KIT

2642 _

... STYLETTES

_ SUCTION-CANNISTER, DISP.

687

BITE STICK

2246

...... iV-STOP COCK

75

02 - AIRWAY - ADULT

3061_

BODY BAG - DISPOSABLE

2881

63

02 - AIRWAY - CHILD

2566 _

BULB SYRINGE

3004

91

02 - AIRWAY - INFANT

„ C COLt AR - BABY NO-NECK

2204 .__.

MED - ACTIVATED CHARCOAL, 25 ML

2873

02 - BAAM AiRWAf MONITOR

MED - ATROPINE SULFATE

18911

02 - BAG VALVE MASK, DISP. ADULT

2S65....

2451

964

C COLLAR PERFIT ACE

2709......... __..MED-BABY.ASPIRIN

L._.. EKG PADS, PED. 3/PK
EKG PADS ADULT 4/PK

.. SUCTION • EXTENSION TUBING
.. SUCTION - FLEX. CATH

828....

_._FR

.. SUCTION - MECONIUM ASPIRATOR

02 - BAG VALVE MASK, DiSP. INFANT

851..

_.. MED - BENADRYL

729

02 - CANNULA - ADULT

SOI

. SYRINGES - ICC

3160

. _ MED - CA GLUCONATE

737 _ _

02 - CANNULA - PEDIATRIC

. ,893.;.

.. SYRINGES-3CC

992

FR

..SUCTION-CARTRIDGE^VAC

844...

MED-ALBUTEROL

C COLLAR - PEDIATRIC

... SPLINT CABDBARD - HAND

190 _

IV-START PACK

..„ MED-ADENOCARD12MG

... SPECIAL HANDLING (EXPLAIN)

1917 _

331

BED PANS (FRACTURE RAN)

... SCALPEL - DISPOSABLE

786...

... SUCTION - YAUNKERS

EKG - QUIK-COMBO REG. - ADULT

1057

___. MED - DEMEROL TUBEX 50 MG

1693

02 - DiSP. HUMIDIFER

EKG QUICK-COMBO ELEC - PED

1032

___ MED - DEMEROL TUBEX 100 MG

2543

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 3.0

2667...

.SYRINGES- I0CC

EME3IS BASIN

1065

__ MED • DEXTROSE 50% 25 MG

1131

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 4.G

199G_.

.. SYRINGES - G0CC CATH. TIP

FIRE EXTINGUISHER

3038

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL. TUBE - 5.0

2477 _

.. SYRINGES - LUERLOCK 60 CC

FURES

22 i 2

_ _ MED - DOPAMINE 400 MG

2584

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 5.5

2774 _

_ THERMOMETER COVER '

GLUCOMETER STICK

1669

„ „ MED -EPINEPHRINE 1/1.000

1156

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 5.0

661 __

HEADVISE ii

1-107

........ MED - EPINEPHRINE 1 /10,000

1933

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 6.5

HEAT PACK

1657

1164

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 7.0

ICE PACK

1461.

1172

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 7.5

IV - INTROCAN CATH. -14

3045

MED-HEP-LOCK 10UNITS

1180

02 -ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE -8.0

IV - INTROCAN OATH. • 16

3152__

MED-HEP-LOCK 100 UNITS

570

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE - 8.5

IV-INTROCAN CATH.-18

1206

IV - INTROCAN CATH. - 20

1675.

IV - INTROCAN CATH. - 22

1214

_ „ MED-LIDOCAINE 100 MG

iV - INTROCAN CATH. - 24

1222

_.._ MED - LIDOCAINE JELLY

966. _
1339....
1347...
1479...
1370„
1362...
1354....
2691 ..
588 „

IV - ARM BOARD - LONG

2931

__ MED - MAGNESIUM SULFATE 5GM

752

02 - EXTENSION TUBING

...... IV - ARM BOARD - SHORT

1255

.__ MED - MORPHINE SULFATE 10 MG

703

02- MASK-ADULT NONBREATHER

___. MED - NARCAN 2MG/CC

._

.

MED - DOaLTAMiHE 250 MG/20 ML VIAL. 1149_

MED-GLUCAGON IMG VIAL
„._. MED - GLUT08E

_._. MED-LASIX 100MG/10CC
MED - LIDOCAINE 0.4% BAG 500 ML

2741

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUSE HOLDER, ADULT

2758

02 - ENDOTRACHEAL TUBE HOLDER. PED

745
2089

2279

02 - ENRICHMENT A3SBY.
_. 02 - ESOPHAGEAL OBTURATOR AIRWAY

IV-D5W 500 ML/SAG

1263

IV - D5W 500 ML/VENTED (GLASS)

2956

MED - NITROGLYCERIN 50 MG/10ML

2287._

IV - EXTENSION SET

2964

MED - NITROR^STE 2% 30GM TUBE

2626

02 - NEBULIZER

IV - INTRA OSSEOUS NEEDLE

1271..........

MED - NITRQSTAT .4 MG

3202

02 - NEBULIZER BEAR

IV - NEEDLE LOCK DEVICE

1659

MED - NORMAL SALINE 10/ML VIAL

3111

02-COMP. AIR

IV - NORMAL SALINE 9%. 500 ML

2220... _...

MED -PHENERGAN

IV - NORMAL SALINE 9 ^ , 1.000 ML

1305

MED - FiTOGIN 10 UNITS

2634

02 - PEEP VALVE

IV - PRESSURE BAG, DISR 500 ML.

- 2872

MED- PROCAINAMIDE iGM^OMLVIAi.

3087

02 - POCKET MASK

695

_ TRANSPORT TEAM PICK-UP/RTN
. URINAL
. VACUTAINER HOLDER
. VACUTAINER LUER ADAPTER
. VACUTAINER TUBE - BLUE
. VACUTAINER TUBE - GRAY
.. VACUTAINER TUBE - LAVENDER
.. VACUTAINER TUBE - RED
. VACUTAINER TUBE - TIGER
. EXTRA ATTENDANT (EXPLAIN)
EXTENSIVE CLEANING (EXPLAIN)

372 _

02 - MASK Hi CONG PEDIATRIC
_.. 02 - NASOPH. AIRWAY

02-P/HR.

... SYRINGES - 5CC

'. 2824

RESPOND/EVALUATE (NO TRANSPORT)

18„

.WAITING TIME IN EXCESS OF

976

FR

.

/

30 MINUTES (EXPLAIN)

(e>uy K*

LTRS.
._LTRS.

IV • PRESSURE BAG, DSSR L000 ML

1412

MED •• SODIUM BICARBONATE ADULT 1768

02 -TRACK MASK

IV - PUMP REQUIRED

1321

MED - SODIUM BICARBONATE PEDIATRIC 2766

02 - TUBE CHECK

IV • PUMP SET • REG.

2097

_.. MED-THIAMINE 100 MG VIAL

2308

02 - VENTILATOR CIRCUIT DiSP

IV - FUkiP SET - NlTRO

3095

_.. MED - TUBEX HOLDER

3194.

SALINE BULLETSs 3CC

£-£

lNairie

*-

'-V

L/f^y.

_L

Agei.„y Incident #

f\A.J

ii

O{-b'<>0^

PRIMARY CONDITION CODE LIST (check all that apply)
D
D
D

abdominal pain
Jtered state of consciousness, (weak, dizzy, lethargic, semionscious, etc.)
)hest pain / angina
rVA or possible CVA
difficulty breathing
ull cardiac arrest
[yperglycemia
isulin Shock / Hypoglycemia

•

?
D
D
D

Respiratory arrest/ failure
Seizures
Shock
Syncopal episode / fainting
Trauma (any injury or pain to any body part)
Trauma multiple (any multiple injury or pain sites)
Vomiting
T
Vomiting blood
Unconscious

SECONDARY CONDITION CODE LIST (check all that apply)
ATORY

GENERAL SIGNS / SYMPTOMS

ORIENTATIONS / PSYCHIATRIC

>nea
laphylaxis
thma
iphysema
iieezing
perventilation

D
•
D
D
•
•
•
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
•

D
D
D

rial Fibrillation
IF
ipboretic
pertension
potension
uteMl
chycardia
gina
adycardia

ABDOMINAL / PREGNANCY

kTIONS REACTIONS
ptalis intoxication
bstance abuse
>sible overdose
ergic reaction

Decubitus ulcers
Dehydration
Difficulty walking
Dizziness
Fever
Infection
Limited range of movement
Malaise / fatigue
Nosebleed
Paralysis
Rectal bleeding
Sepsis
UTI
Hematuria
Sickle cell crisis

D
D
•
D
D
D
D
D
•

Pregnancy complications
Labor pains / contractions
Premature birth
Obstetric delivery (term)
Miscarriage
Toxemia
Vaginal bleeding
i GlbteedingPancreatitis

Bizarre behavior
Combative / aggressive
Confusion / disorientation
Depression
ETOH
Hallucinations
Suicidal tendencies

a
D
D

a

>J / INJURIES / ILLNESSES

PAI1

D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D

Burns
Injured in fall
Injured in auto accident
Injured in fight / brawl
Injured in rape
Drowning / submerging
Head injury
Neck injury
Chest injury
Back injury
Shoulder injury
Hip injury
Fractured hip
Fracture (site)

D

Extremity injury, (site)

D

PAIN / INJURIES / ILLNESSES
(continued)
D
Gun shot wound

•

Stabbing / cutting wound

D

Laceration/abrasion(site)

D

Cancer (site)

D
D

PEG tube complications
0 tube complications
Shunt / cath complications
Dialysis
Renal failure

•

D
D

NOTES / EXPLANATION:

REASON FOR TRANSPORT
insported
insported
insported
insported

for higher level of care
for x-ray / cat scan, etc.
for heart catheterization
for foley cath replacement

D
D^
D
D
D

Transported for PEG tube replacement
Neonatal transport
Transported for dialysis
Transported for radiation therapy
Transported for physical therapy / rehab

D
•
D

Transported for surgery
Transport home / SNF / ECF
This is an interfacility transfer,
Yes
,No
.

OTHER REASONS FOR TRANSPORT (CHECK ALL THAT APPLY)
is transported in an EMERGENCY SITUATION, e g., accident,
jry or acute illness.
&iod to be restrained,
ysical
, Verbal
, Medication
.
is unconscious or in shock
quired oxygen or other emergency treatment on way to the
Jinahon
Version 1 1

D
D
D

Had to remain immobile because of a fracture or the possibility of a
fracture
Was bed confined?
Yes
, No
.
Explain"
Could only be moved by stretcher9
Explain

Yes

No
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LAW O F F I C E S OF

SIEGFRIED & J E N S E N
NED P SIEGFRIED
M I T C H E L L R. J E N S E N *
P R E S T O N L. H A N D Y
MATTHEW J . STOREY
M I C H A E L A. KAT2
D U S T I N LANCE
SAMUEL ADAMS

S664

SOUTH G R E E N

STREET

MXJEHAY, UTAH: 8 4 1 2 3
T E L E P H O N E : {SOU 2 6 6 - 0 3 9 9
FAX' ( S O I )
PROVO
375-0999

or COUNSEL
M I C H A E L F. R I C H M A N *
J A M E S W. G I L S O N

266-1338
OGDEN

399-0999

•ALSO ADMITTED IN CALIFORNIA

September 18,2002

LEGAL ASSISTANTS
B R Y A N T E HANSON
S T E P H A N I E MASH
BETTY M CUMMOCK
G R E G MALONE
G E O R G E SERGAKIS
TAMMARA SHEPARD
R U B E N MARTINEZ
T O N I A. S I N G L E T A R Y
SANDY LEATHERBURY
KATHY D U G D A L E
A N N LE
JILL HANSEN
C A R L O S OJEDA
BETTY J E A N HUTKIN
CINDY DISRAELI
C H R I S OGURA
STACEY BEALS
MINDY SWENSON

UTAH STATE RISK MANAGEMENT
Attn: Jim Sefandonakis
5120 South Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Utah Attorney General
STATE OF UTAH
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Salt Lake County Recorder
2001 South State Street, Suite N-1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1150

Re:

Our Client:
Your Insured:
Date of Loss:

Delone Peeples
Utah State Liquor Store
December 5, 2001

NOTICE OF CLAIM
Delone Peeples, by and through her attorney of record, Dustin Lance of
Siegfried & Jensen, does hereby give Notice of Claim against the State of Utah,
pursuant to U.C.A. §63-30-11, for injuries she sustained and damages incurred.
On December 5, 2001, Ms. Peeples fell in front of a Utah State Liquor
Store on ice, which was allowed to accumulate on the sidewalk, from a poorly
designed rain gutter that drains onto the top of the sidewalk, rather than
underneath it.

NOTICE OF CLAIM
Re: Delone Peeples
September 18, 2002
Page Two

Liability is clear in this case. The State of Utah was negligent, in among
things, failing to take adequate measures of ice removal, especially considering
the facts which would put them on notice of this dangerous condition.
Due to the negligence of the State of Utah, Delone Peeples sustained
serious injuries, including, but not limited to, multiple hip fractures, multiple
contusions and abrasions to her left leg, left ankle, back, left shoulder and left
arm pain. Ms. Peeples has undergone treatment for her injuries and will continue
to undergo treatment and therefore has and will continue to incur medical
expenses in connection with this incident. Delone Peeples claims damages
related to the injuries sustained in the incident, including damages for any
permanent impairment she may have suffered. All of these damage
components, including any others discovered as this matter proceeds, need to be
addressed.
Based on the above, Delone Peeples gives notice of her claim for
damages against the State of Utah.
DATED this

[Lj

day of September, 2002.
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

^
v«*«s—

Dustin Lance
Attorney for Claimant
DLwh

#

_

